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“Save a piece of country like that intact, and it does not matter in 
the slightest that only a few people every year will go into it. That is 
precisely its value . . . . We simply need that wild country available to 
us, even if we never do more than drive to its edge and look in. For it 
can be a means of reassuring ourselves of our sanity as creatures, a part 
of the geography of hope.” –Wallace Stegner1  
In 2016, President Obama, using his authority under the Antiquities Act, 
designated 1.35 million acres of federal land in southeast Utah a National 
Monument.2 This land became known as Bears Ears National Monument.3 Bears 
Ears featured classic Southwestern landscapes, including pristine sandstone 
canyons, mesas, ancient human dwellings, and artifacts with tribal significance.4 
Five tribes, the Navajo, Hopi, Zuni, Northern Ute, and Ute Mountain, have 
significant cultural ties to the land.5 In the words of Malcolm Lehi, a member of the 
Ute Mountain Ute tribe, “[a]t Bears Ears we can hear the voices of our ancestors in 
every canyon and on every mesa top.”6 Native American tribes applauded the Bears 
Ears National Monument designation, believing that the action would protect these 
resources from the increasing pressure for resource extraction and other 
exploitative activities.7  
Unfortunately, shortly after President Trump took office in early 2017, he 
directed Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke to review national monument designations 
with an eye toward fostering more development on these federal lands.8 In 
December of that year, President Trump then announced plans to reduce the size 
of Bears Ears National Monument.9 Trump’s administration ultimately reduced the 
size of Bears Ears National Monument by 85 percent.10 No longer designated a 
national monument area, these excluded lands and resources once again became 
vulnerable to private exploitation.11 Less than two years after President Obama had 
 
1.  Greg Christensen, What Wallace Stegner Taught Me About the Bears Ears, MEDIUM (Oct. 10, 
2017), https://medium.com/@happygrc/what-wallace-stegner-taught-me-about-the-bears-ears-
1058dceb3dcd (describing the Bears Ears National Monument lands). 
2. See Ethel Branch & Daniel Cordalis, The Unlawful Reduction of Bears Ears National 
Monument: An Executive Overreach, 49 No. 5 ABA TRENDS 4, 4 (2018).  
3. Id.   
4.  See Michael Nordskog, Tribes, Environmental Groups Sue Trump over National Monument 
Purge, 38 No. 11 WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 1, 1 (2017).  
5.  See Charles Wilkinson, “At Bears Ears We Can Hear the Voices of Our Ancestors in Every 
Canyon and on Every Mesa Top”: The Creation of the First Native National Monument, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
317, 318 (2018).  
6.  Id. at 325.  
7.  Id. at 319. 
8.  See Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President Trump is Changing Environmental 
Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 15, 2019), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is-
changing-science-environment/. 
9.  See Hannah Nordhaus, What Trump’s Shrinking of National Monuments Actually Means, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/trump-shrinks-bears-
ears-grand-staircase-escalante-national-monuments/. 
10.  See id.  
11.  Id.  
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protected them under a national monument designation, a new president had 
reopened the lands for business and once again placed their long-term security in 
serious doubt. This dramatic reversal begs a critical question: how could federal 
laws be restructured to better protect precious public lands resources against the 
short-sighted whims of powerful politicians and the corporations who support 
them? 
This Article argues that the federal government’s fiduciary duty to protect 
public lands necessitates the creation of a more stable policy structure that places 
more stringent limits on executive authority over natural resource management. 
Part I of this article provides a general background on the laws that have historically 
protected public lands and the recent trends around the management of these 
resources. Part II frames the federal government’s recent pendulum swings in 
public lands management through an academic lens to help explain these trends 
and their costs to society and to identify general strategies for addressing this 
problem. Part III proposes specific statutory changes capable of greatly increasing 
stability and better promoting the most imperative goals of federal public lands 
management. By strengthening and clarifying the statutory regime that governs 
federal land management officials’ activities, policymakers could greatly increase 
the long-term security of the nation’s precious public lands.   
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT  
An overview of the United States’ federal public land management structure 
and its history highlights the troubling nature of recent developments in this area 
of environmental policy. Federal public lands are lands that are owned and 
controlled by the U.S. federal government.12 Four federal agencies manage the 
public lands: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service, the 
Bureau of Reclamation–all of which are within the Department of Interior 
(“Interior”)–and the U.S. Forest Service, which is within the Department of 
Agriculture.13 As of 2017, the federal government held title to 744.1 million acres 
of land and 801.3 million acres of minerals.14  
The most significant recent changes to the federal government’s governance 
approach have involved public lands and onshore resources managed by the 
Interior, which includes national parks, national forests, national wildlife refuges, 
national conservation areas, national monuments, wildernesses, national historical 
sites, national memorials, national battlefields, national recreation areas, wild and 
scenic rivers, national seashores and lakeshores, and national trails.15 The Interior 
has a statutory duty to manage these lands for the benefit of all current and future 
generations of Americans.16 The following subsections provide a brief overview of 
public land law throughout U.S. history, outline the National Environmental Policy 
 
12.  See Rebecca W. Watson & Nora Pincus, Hot Topics on Public Lands at the End of Obama Era, 
36 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 5, 126 (2015). 
13.  See id.  
14.  U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Public Land Statistics 2017, at 7 (2018). 
15.  See America’s Public Lands Explained, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR: BLOG (June 13, 2016), 
https://www.doi.gov/blog/americas-public-lands-explained.  
16.  43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2018). 
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Act’s requirements for federal agency action and how they impact the management 
of public lands, and describe some disturbing recent trends in public land 
management.  
A.  Historical Policy Approaches to Public Land Use Management 
As commentators Rebecca Watson and Nora Pincus have aptly explained, the 
history of U.S. public land management is arguably divisible into four eras that are 
each defined by their own unique guiding principle: the acquisition era, disposition 
era, retention era, and management era.17 The shifts in policy across these eras 
reflect the shifts in the priorities of the federal government, and in each era 
Congress passed legislation to further the government’s land management goals.  
During the first of these eras, the acquisition era, the federal government’s 
primary goal was the acquisition of land.18 In 1781, the first public lands were 
created when the state of New York ceded to the federal government its claim to 
lands extending to the Mississippi that had not yet been settled by Europeans.19 
Then, from 1781 to 1867, the federal government acquired roughly 1.8 billion acres 
of land.20 During this era, the U.S. Constitution became the law of the land and the 
Property Clause ensured that Congress would have control over the regulation of 
public lands.21 
Once the federal government had acquired an abundance of land, the primary 
focus of U.S. public land policy shifted from acquiring additional land to dispensing 
portions of existing public land to private parties.22 Federal policymakers knew that 
convincing settlers to homestead and developing the nation’s vast remote lands 
could drive economic growth, and so they enacted legislation designed to promote 
westward expansion.23 The Homestead Act granted fee simple title to 160 acres of 
land to any citizen or intended citizen, if they improved the land.24 Improving the 
land under this statute consisted of building a dwelling or cultivating crops on the 
land.25 Congress also enacted statutes granting title to minerals or other resources 
to settlers willing to develop them.26 The General Mining Act, enacted in 1872, 
allowed citizens and potential citizens to explore and purchase lands found to have 
 
17.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 126–36. 
18.  See id. at 127–28. 
19.  See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 14, at 1. 
20.  Id.  
21.  See Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Trump Public Lands Revolution: Redefining “The 
Public” in Public Lands Law, 48 ENVTL. L. 311, 319 (2018). The Property Clause grants exclusive authority 
to Congress, and therefore any authority of the President or executive agencies, is authority that was 
expressly delegated to them from Congress. Id. 
22.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 14, at 128–32. 
23.  See id. The federal government was also motivated to sell public lands to private owners 
because it brought revenue to the government. See Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market Value of Public 
Resources, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1530–32 (2015). This policy also furthered national defense because 
often there were conflicts with Native Americans at the frontiers, and settlement was seen as a defense 
from their attack. Id. 
24.  See Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public Domain Law and Policy: An 
Alternate to the Shift-to-Retention Thesis, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649, 713 (1999). 
25.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 129–30.  
26.  See id. at 128–31. 
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mineral deposits.27 The Homestead Act and the General Mining Act are just two 
examples of the many statutes enacted during this time under which the federal 
government purposefully conveyed title to a wealth of federal public lands and 
other resources, receiving little or nothing in return.28 
Then, in the early twentieth century, the focus of public lands management 
shifted again as federal agencies sought primarily to retain and manage the lands 
and resources that remained in the federal government’s control.29 During this era, 
Congress enacted laws promoting the federal government’s retention of fee title to 
public lands and mere leasing of lands or their mineral rights to private citizens.30 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the federal government’s authority to take this 
approach in the case Light v. United States.31 Specifically, the Light Court found that 
“the federal government could retain public lands for broad national benefits . . . 
indefinitely,”32 acknowledging that “public lands of the nation are held in trust for 
the people.”33 Other legislation enacted during this era allowed the government to 
more heavily regulate public land uses and created new revenue streams to the 
government through new leasing and other arrangements.34 Private stakeholders 
operating during this era favored these changes because they provided more 
stabilized access to resources.35  
Statutes enacted during this “retention” era of public lands management 
included the Taylor Grazing Act and the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA).36 Congress 
enacted the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934 “to stabilize the livestock industry and 
protect the rights of sheep and cattle growers from interference.”37 It authorized 
the Secretary of the Interior to create grazing districts from unreserved parcels of 
land in the public domain, which were then managed by the Interior.38 Landowners 
and homesteaders were able to apply for permits to have their animals graze on 
 
27.  See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2018). See also Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 129. The General 
Mining Law and other mining statutes enacted during this era encouraged development and a “use it or 
lose it” attitude. Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 24, at 714–15. 
28.  Other statutes include the Coal Lands Act, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, the Enlarged 
Homestead Act, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the Lands Acts of 1796 and 1800. See Watson & 
Pincus, supra note 12, at 130–31. 
29.  See Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 24, at 650. Some historians believed this shift to a policy 
of retention was enacted to address the greed and waste created by the previous era of disposition. Id. 
at 655–56. However, Raymond and Fairfax argue that this narrative leaves out many other aspects of 
the story. Id. 
30.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 130. 
31.  Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911). 
32.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 127. 
33.  Id. at 128. 
34.  See Huber, supra note 23, at 1536; see also Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 132–34. 
35.  See Huber, supra note 23, at 1536. 
36.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 132–33. 
37.  Faulkner v. Watt, 661 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1981). 
38.  See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2018). 
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the land.39 Similarly, in 1920 Congress enacted the MLA, which allows citizens to 
lease mineral rights on federal lands through a competitive leasing process.40    
During this period, the federal government also began enacting legislation 
aimed at setting aside certain selected public lands for recreation and 
conservation.41 Congress enacted the Forest Reservation Amendment to the 
General Revision Act, the Forest Management Act, and the National Park Service 
Organic Act, which were primarily focused on preventing overuse and preserving 
certain sections of forest.42 Congress’ enactment of such conservation-oriented 
statutes during this era is evidence that the federal government was beginning to 
recognize that public lands had multiple important uses and were not merely assets 
to be exploited. This shift in attitudes eventually led the nation into the most recent 
public land era: the management era. 
Since the 1970s, the federal government’s primary focus with regard to public 
lands has been that of managing these lands for multiple uses.43 This management-
centered era emerged from a shift in public opinion in the U.S. toward greater 
concern for environmental protection and conservation.44 In response to this shift, 
the federal government embraced a more holistic approach to public lands 
management. This new approach is visible in the Congress’ 1976 enactment of the 
Federal Land Policy Management Act (“FLPMA”). FLPMA mandated that the 
Secretary of the Interior manage public lands for “multiple use and sustained 
yield.”45 The statute emphasized the importance of ensuring future generations had 
access to resources. Although the FLPMA still allowed relatively high rates of 
resource extraction, it exemplified a broader trend toward a greater emphasis on 
sustainability and less on extraction of resources. Indeed, Congress enacted many 
of the nation’s primary federal environmental statutes during the same decade that 
it enacted the FLMPA.46 Most notably, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) effectively requires federal agencies to conduct certain environmental 
assessments before taking a wide range of actions involving federal public lands.47 
The following subsection describes NEPA and its impacts on public land 
management.  
B. Federal Public Lands and NEPA 
NEPA is perhaps the most famous environmental legislation in the U.S. and 
greatly impacts the nation’s approach to managing federal public lands. Signed into 
law by President Nixon on January 1, 1970, NEPA is the nation’s most far-reaching 
 
39.  See id. 
40.  See Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 24, at 740. Raymond and Fairfax call into question the 
actual control retained by the federal government under the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. They argue the 
federal government gave away much of the “bundle of sticks” although they do acknowledge that under 
the statute the federal government retains the potential to exert more control over the minerals leased. 
Id. 
41.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 133–34. 
42.  See id. 
43.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 14, at 1. 
44.  See id. 
45.  43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2018). 
46.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 133–36. 
47.  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2018). 
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congressional act aimed at protecting the natural environment.48 The declared 
purpose of NEPA is:   
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and 
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to the Nation; and to establish the Council of Environmental 
Quality.49 
i. History of NEPA 
From the late 1960s through the 1970s, there was a period of increased 
interest in environmental conservation in the U.S. known colloquially as the 
“environmental revolution.”50 In the decades preceding the environmental 
revolution, the U.S. had seen the gradual degradation of its pristine natural 
environment and wildlife.51 There were concerns about the health of the nation’s 
waterways. Many were being used as open sewers, emitting foul smells and a few 
even occasionally caught on fire.52 There were also concerns about ambient air 
quality, as major cities like Los Angeles were dealing with unprecedented air 
pollution.53 Insecticides such as DDT were likewise in wide use, and there were 
growing concerns about the potential health impacts of such substances on humans 
and wildlife.54 In the midst of this, the publication of Rachel Carson’s book, “Silent 
Spring,” and a culmination of other factors fueled an unprecedented environmental 
movement.   
Under the Nixon administration, the U.S. saw the enactment of several 
environmental statutes that still have broad impacts on today’s environmental 
landscape.55 These acts included NEPA, the Endangered Species Act and extensive 
amendments to the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.56. Collectively, these new 
laws marked a substantial change in the federal government’s role in 
environmental conservation, including on public lands.  
 
 
ii.  NEPA Requirements  
 
48.  Id.  
49.  Id.  
50.  See Lynn E. Blais, The Legitimate Reach of the Environmental Revolution, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 13, 14 (2014).  
51.  See id. at 14–15. 
52.  See id. at 15.  
53.  See id.  
54.  See id.  
55.  See Blais, supra note 50, at 13–14.   
56.  See id. at 14.  
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Although the overarching goal of NEPA was to declare a national policy that 
encourages productive harmony between man and the environment, the statute 
also sets forth specific environmental protection requirements that government 
agencies must strictly follow.57 NEPA requires that when a federal agency 
commences any “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment” the agency must produce a detailed report describing:  
i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, ii) any 
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, iii) alternatives to the proposed action, iv) 
the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.58 
An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a written statement addressing 
the five aforementioned requirements for a given government action.59 EISs are 
required under NEPA only when the proposed government action is deemed 
“major” and has the potential to “significantly affect” the environment.60 This 
statutory language affords the relative federal agency some discretion when 
deciding whether producing an EIS is necessary. In some instances, an agency can 
claim that the proposed government action is not “major” or that it will not 
“significantly affect” the environment.61  
When there is uncertainty over whether a proposed government action will 
“significantly affect” the environment, the federal agency involved may choose to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry called an “Environmental Assessment.”62 An 
Environmental Assessment provides a rudimentary assessment of the proposed 
government action and helps the federal agency decide whether a full EIS is 
required.63 If the Environmental Assessment shows that there is a likelihood that 
the proposed government action will significantly affect the environment, then the 
relative federal agency is required to produce a full EIS, submit it for public 
comment, and encompass those public comments in the final version of its EIS.  
Although NEPA’s environmental review requirements help to promote 
environmental protection on public lands, they also afford wide discretion to 
agencies that is increasingly interfering with that goal. For example, when 
producing an EIS, the relative federal agency must use the “best evidence” or “best 
 
57.  See S. REP. NO. 91–296, at 2 (1969). 
58.  Dominic A. Cossi, Getting Our Priorities Straight: Streamlining NEPA to Hasten Renewable 
Energy Development on Public Land, 31 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 149, 154 (2010).  
59.  See id.  
60.  See id.  
61.  See id.  
62.  See id.  
63.  See id. The requirements under NEPA are strictly procedural. Cossi, supra note 58, at 154. 
The goal of the NEPA requirements is to have the federal agencies take an informed look at their 
proposed action. Id. at 155. There are no substantive guarantees under NEPA, only procedural 
requirements. Id. While the goal is to ensure informed decision making by federal agencies, NEPA still 
grants the agency wide discretion on how to produce the EIS along with the final determination. Id.  
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science available.”64 This statutory language gives the federal agency some 
discretion, as there are continued debates over what constitutes the best science 
available and opinions on such questions have often changed with changes in 
presidential administrations. For example, under the Trump administration, federal 
agencies are less likely to consider climate change science in connection with 
environmental review.65 In contrast, President Trump and multiple members of his 
administration have openly questioned climate change science and shown far less 
interest in requiring the consideration of it in the context of an EIS.66  
iii.  NEPA Judicial Review  
Unfortunately, courts’ strong deference to federal agencies in the NEPA 
review process is increasingly undermining the effectiveness of the statute as a tool 
for environmental protection. The case of Protect Our Communities Foundation v. 
Jewell illustrates courts’ tendency to defer to agency expertise when judging the 
adequacy of an EIS.67 In Jewell, the plaintiffs challenged the construction of a wind 
farm based on NEPA, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Bald and Golden Eagle 
Protection Act.68 The Jewell court determined that “compliance with NEPA involves 
the application of a ‘rule of reason,’ which involves the ‘pragmatic judgment 
whether the EIS’s form, content, and preparation foster both informed decision-
making and informed public participation.”69 However, the critical takeaway from 
Jewell is that the “reviewing court will not ‘substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.’”70 In short, courts afford agencies significant discretion when making 
judgments in areas that they perceive involve complex scientific issues requiring 
agency expertise, so long as agencies’ decisions seem based on rational analysis. 
This deferential approach to judicial review frees agencies to make informed 
decisions without a constant threat of deep judicial scrutiny into specialized subject 
matters. However, such deferential review can also effectively insulate agencies in 
ways that jeopardize the overarching goals of NEPA and related statutes.   
iv. NEPA Public Comment Mandate   
When implemented correctly, NEPA ensures that government agencies take 
an informed look, encompassing public concerns, when deciding to lease public 
lands. A critical part of the EIS requirement under NEPA is the opportunity for the 
public to be heard on the proposed action.71 This public comment mandate would 
 
64.  Cossi, supra note 58, at 154.  
65.  Thein T. Chau, Implications of the Trump Administration’s Withdrawal of the Final CEQ 
Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in NEPA 
Reviews, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 713, 714 (2018).  
66 See John C. Dernbach, Lawyering as if Tomorrow Matters, 86 UMKC L. REV. 759, 764 (2018).  
67See Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 2016).  
68.  Id. at 577–88. 
69.  Id. at 579 (quoting Churchill Cty. v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
70.  Id. at 583 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983)).  
71.  See Public Lands, PROTECT NEPA, https://protectnepa.org/public-lands/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2019). 
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ideally allow private citizens to work with the government to produce land use plans 
that at least consider the interests of all stakeholders. These federally mandated 
public comment forums contribute to the transparency of federal actions and 
increases the likelihood that government agencies will be held accountable for their 
management of public lands. Unfortunately, some recent proposals to streamline 
NEPA requirements would significantly reduce the public’s ability to be heard on 
public land leasing decisions.72   
v. NEPA Procedural Pitfalls  
Although an underlying goal of NEPA is to ensure a productive harmony 
between Americans and their natural environment, the practical implementation 
of the statute sometimes falls short in furthering that goal. As stated above, NEPA 
requires that a federal agency prepare an EIS when its proposed action will 
“significantly affect” the environment.73 The Center of Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
has defined “significantly affect” as encompassing two facts: context and 
intensity.74 Context “delimits the scope of the agency’s action, including the 
interests affected.” ”Intensity relates to the degree to which the agency action 
affects the locale and interests identified in the context of the inquiry.”75  Like other 
statutory phrases highlighted above, this language affords federal agencies 
significant discretion when determining whether a proposed action significantly 
affects the environment and thus triggers an EIS requirement.  
If a federal agency finds that its proposed action would have no significant 
effect on the environment, it can issue a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI).76 
An agency may issue a FONSI only if it can show that there will be no environmental 
effects from the action at issue or that the environmental affects will be adequately 
mitigated.77 However, there are certain loopholes that agencies can use to avoid 
ultimately implementing mitigation measures.78 Likewise, courts often defer to 
federal agencies’ issuance of a FONSI unless the conclusions of the agency’s experts 
clearly contradict those of opposing parties.79 This additional layer of federal agency 
discretion is another avenue for agencies potentially shield themselves from NEPA 
litigation through the use of experts that align with their views. 
 
vi. History of Streamlining NEPA for Renewables  
The Obama administration’s efforts to streamline NEPA review process for 
renewable energy projects has unfortunately made the process more vulnerable to 
further streamlining for less-deserving types of activities. The Obama 
 
72.  See Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).  
73.  See Cossi, supra note 58, at 154.  
74.  Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1129 (D. Or. 2002). 
75.  Id.  
76.  See Constance E. Brooks, Avoiding NEPA Pitfalls, 2006 No.1 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 11 
(2006).  
77.  See id.  
78.  See id.  
79.  See id.  
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administration streamlined NEPA requirements to expedite the permitting process 
for renewable energy projects on public lands.80 The administration’s goal was to 
fast-track renewable energy development on public lands, and many supporters at 
the time applauded the move as a valuable way to create new “green collar” jobs.81 
Now, however, it appears that streamlining NEPA requirements for those projects 
may have had an ancillary effect of making it easier for the Trump Administration 
to similarly argue for NEPA review streamlining for other forms of public lands 
leasing. Interestingly, some experts argue that NEPA requirements could 
theoretically be streamlined, but still include the necessary requirements to protect 
the environment.82 Now, it seems as if the Trump Administration is using a similar 
strategy to streamline NEPA requirements for leasing public lands for fossil fuel or 
minerals extraction. The following subsection discusses the leasing process and 
recent efforts to streamline it in ways that could jeopardize long-term conservation 
goals.  
C. The Leasing Process 
Federal laws and regulations currently governing the leasing process for public 
lands arguably create excessive discretion for agencies in ways that can lead to the 
overexploitation of public land resources. Congress has delegated authority to the 
Interior to “prescribe necessary and proper rules and regulations and to do any and 
all things necessary to carry out and accomplish the purposes of the Mineral Leasing 
Act.”83 Under this authority, the Interior has implemented regulations for oil, gas, 
and coal leases on public lands.84 This is among the Interior’s most important tasks, 
as they manage more than 23,657 active onshore oil, gas, and coal leases.85  
Because of the quantities of resources involved, the potential environmental 
impacts of the agency’s leasing decisions are also critically important.  For instance, 
experts have estimated that between 349 and 492 gigatons of potential carbon 
dioxide emissions are contained in fossil fuels on public lands.86  
In connection with leasing activities on onshore public lands, the Interior 
typically produces a document entitled a “Resource Management Plan.”87 Resource 
Management Plans are “land use plan[s] that describe[] broad multiple-use 
direction for managing public lands administered by the BLM.”88 The Resource 
 
80.  See Watson & Pincus, supra note 12, at 125. 
81.  See Cossi, supra note 58, at 160.  
82.  Id. at 168.  
83.  See Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal 
Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2018). 
84.  See id.  
85.  See id.  
86.  See Thomas R. Delahanty, Executive Authority to Keep it in the Ground: An Administrative 
End to Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Land, 35 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145, 147 (2017).  
87.   See Hein, supra note 83, at 11.  
88.  What is an RMP?, Subsection of Winnemucca District Resource Management Plan, U.S. DEP’T 
INTERIOR BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-
office/eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=renderDefaultPlanOrProjectSite&projectId=47
537 (Sept. 8, 2016 12:51 P.M.). 
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Management Plan communicates to private fossil fuel companies which federal 
lands are eligible for resource extraction.89  
After the government identifies specific parcels of public land as being 
appropriate for resource extraction, private fossil fuel companies “nominate” 
parcels they are interested in leasing.90 Upon receiving nominations, the Interior 
then produces either an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact 
Statement.91 Then, the agency sells the lease rights at auction to the highest 
bidder.92 Under federal law, the terms of any oil, gas or coal extraction lease must 
be sold competitively and ensure that U.S. citizens receive “fair market value” for 
the use of public lands for resource extraction.93   
One controversial issue involving the Interior’s current leasing process is what 
some argue are stagnant minimum bids and royalty rates.94 The Interior does not 
systematically review the fiscal terms for oil and gas leases on public lands.95 
Interestingly, some of the fiscal terms at which the federal government leases 
public lands for resource extraction have not been changed since the 1920s.96 The 
Interior uses two methods to determine the “fair market value” of public land 
leases.97 The first approach uses historical pricing methods, comparing past mineral 
leases to judge whether a current bid is adequate.98 The second approach for 
determining “fair market value” uses the projected revenue stream overtime.99 
However, both these approaches may be vulnerable to exploitation and result in 
the government receiving below “fair market value” for public land leases.100 One 
major drawback of both approaches is that all calculations used to determine the 
“fair market value” are confidential.101 The public has no ability to analyze how the 
Interior calculated the fair market value of leasing public lands, and whether 
externalities are taken into consideration.102 The first approach is also vulnerable 
to a cyclical result of accepting bids that are less than fair market value.103 If the 
Interior wishes to receive “fair market value” for the nation’s precious natural 
resources, it should amend the fiscal terms of the lease to account for externalities, 
inflation, improved technology, and updated science.  
i. A Recent Shift in Public Lands Policy 
 
89.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 11.  
90.  Id.   
91.  Id.  
92.  Id.  
93.  Pursuant to The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments of 
1976, leases for oil, gas, and coal extraction on public lands must be sold competitively.  See id. at 13.  
94.  See id. at 17.  
95.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 12. 
96.  See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Coal Leasing: BLM Could Enhance Appraisal 
Process, More Explicitly Consider Coal Exports, and Provide More Public Information (2013), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659801.pdf. 
97.  See Hein, supra note 833, at 15. 
98.  See id.  
99.  See id.  
100.  See Huber, supra note 23, at 1517–18.  
101.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 15.  
102.  Id.  
103.  Id. at 21.  
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The most troubling recent trend in public lands policy in the U.S. is its 
migration away from conservation principles and toward a focus on increased 
exploitation for short-term gain. Throughout time, federal public lands 
management policies have grown increasingly protective of non-extractive uses of 
public lands and of the lands’ long-term conservation.104 President Obama utilized 
the federal statutory scheme for public lands to advance progressive environmental 
goals by limiting mineral leasing, promoting renewable energy development on 
public lands and enacting other policies with an ultimate goal of mitigating climate 
change.105 Of course, President Trump has shifted the nation’s public lands 
management policies in the opposite direction.106 At the World Economic Forum in 
2017, President Trump declared that America was “open for business.”107 Since he 
has taken office he has followed through and, arguably, made America’s public 
lands more open for business with fossil fuel companies than they have been in 
decades. Many in Congress seem to support at least some public lands 
conservation, as evidenced by the introduction of a bill in early 2019 that would 
designate 1.3 million acres as wilderness, block mining around Yellowstone, and 
continue the federal Land Water Conservation Fund.108 Unfortunately, although 
there is overwhelming support for this bill and President Trump is expected to sign 
it into law, the bill only impacts less than 1% of the land owned by the federal 
government and has been criticized for not going far enough to ensure meaningful 
conservation.109 On the whole, the direction of federal public lands management 
undeniably took a major turn over the past few years. The following subsection 
discusses President Obama’s policies related to federal public lands and highlights 
the drastic changes made under President Trump’s administration.  
ii. Recent Changes in the Leasing Process  
Different administrations have had varied approaches to the leasing of public 
lands in the U.S., but the policy reversals evident over the past few years in this area 
have arguably been more dramatic than ever before. In 2016, President Obama 
announced in his State of the Union address that he planned to “push to change 
the way we manage our oil and coal resources, so that they better reflect the costs 
they impose on taxpayers and our planet.”110 Soon after his address, the Interior 
issued a moratorium on coal leasing, claiming that the moratorium would protect 
the environment and better allow the government to manage coal leases on public 
 
104.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 26.  
105.  See id. at 2.  
106.  See id. at 3.  
107.  Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., Address at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/president-donald-trumps-davos-address-
in-full-8e14ebc1-79bb-4134-8203-95efca182e94/. 
108.  See Susan Mason & Paul Smith, Congress is Finally Funding and Protecting Public Lands - but 
it's not Enough, THE HILL (Mar. 8, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-
environment/433225-congress-is-finally-funding-and-protecting-public-lands-but-its. 
109.  See id. 
110.  Barack Obama, President of the U.S., 2016 State of the Union Address (Jan. 13, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/7TGJ-SEJ7.  
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lands to ensure taxpayers were getting a fair return.111 The moratorium, which was 
originally implemented for a duration of three years, aimed to give the government 
time to align its environmental objectives with federal land leasing.112 Specifically, 
the Obama administration hoped to create a comprehensive plan under which the 
federal government could lease public lands for fossil fuel extraction while also 
helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.113  
However, shortly after President Trump took office, he issued an executive 
order in March of 2017 effectively lifting the coal moratorium implemented under 
the Obama administration.114 The executive order required agencies to review all 
regulations burdening the development of natural resource and suspend, revise, or 
rescind unduly burdensome regulations.115 The executive order discontinued the 
use of master lease plans, threatened public comment opportunities, and did not 
require officials to visit the proposed lease sites.116 Pursuant to this executive order, 
the BLM released an Instruction Memorandum expediting the leasing process.117  
The federal government’s current public lands leasing framework could fail to 
ensure that leases are sold in a competitive market. Large private fossil fuel 
companies regularly nominate tracts of public land that are adjacent to their 
existing oil, gas, and coal operations.118 This is a considerable advantage for these 
fossil fuel companies, as they already have the infrastructure in place to mine that 
specific area. Unfortunately, this leads to uncompetitive auctions where other 
companies simply can’t match the price and remain profitable. A 2013 study by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) showed that 90 percent of public land 
lease auctions had only one bidder.119 Additionally, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
contributed to the noncompetitive nature of public land leases.120 The Act granted 
the BLM the authority to expand the portion of land leased for existing coal leases 
from 160 to 960 acres.121 The practical consequence of this Act is that private 
companies with existing coal leases could increase the amount of public land they 
could mine, without competitive opposition from other companies. Interestingly, 
the BLM approved 45 lease modification requests from 2010 to 2013.122 The current 
government framework for leasing public lands casts serious doubt on whether the 
government is receiving fair market value in exchange for the nation’s precious 
public land resources. Moreover, these below-market lease rates are even less 
likely to ensure that lessees are internalizing the significant environmental and 
intergenerational costs of their extraction activities on federal lands. 
 
111.  See Blumm & Jamin, supra note 21, at 349.  
112.  See id. at 350.  
113.  See id. at 349–50. 
114.  See Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
115.  See id. 
116.  See id. Master Leases are aimed to keep leases away from pristine national parks and other 
environmentally sensitive areas.  
117.  Bureau of Land Mgmt., Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-034,  Updating Oil and Gas 
Leasing Reform - Land Use Planning and Lease Parcel Reviews (2018).  
118.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 13.  
119.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 96. 
120.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 13.  
121.  Id.   
122.  Id.  
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iii. Recent Changes to the NEPA Process 
To make matters even worse, recent attempts to streamline the NEPA review 
process as a means of promoting economic development could make public lands 
even more vulnerable to overexploitation. In August of 2017, President Trump 
issued an executive order directing federal agencies to “‘apply NEPA in a manner 
that reduces unnecessary burdens and delays as much as possible’” when making 
determinations regarding proposed federal action.123  Shortly after Trump’s 
executive order, the Interior instituted a 150 page limit for most EISs and ordered 
that nearly all NEPA reviews be completed within one year of their 
commencement.124 The goal of the Interior was to reduce the paperwork associated 
with leases for public lands, but the actual effect potentially threatens the 
protection of those lands. Under this new page limit and time restriction, 
government agencies become more likely to make decisions regarding the leasing 
of public lands without adequate information and may not be able to sufficiently 
examine alternatives to the proposed government action.  
The Trump administration’s attempts to streamline NEPA requirements could 
also hinder the public citizens’ ability to participate in federal leasing matters. Public 
notice and comment are critical to ensure that local citizens who will be directly 
affected by a proposed government action have an opportunity to be heard. 
Without a forum for mandated public comment, decisions about the leasing of 
public lands will be made by politicians and private parties detached from the actual 
effects of their proposed action. In the short run, the Trump administration’s 
streamlining of NEPA requirements may benefit private businesses interested in 
federal public lands leases.  However, such changes are likely to also impose 
significant harms on others, including future generations.  
iv. Potential Consequences 
If each new presidential administration is able to implement public lands 
management policies that are vastly different from those under previous 
administrations, such inconsistency could severely undermine the long-term 
preservation of these precious resources. President’s Trump’s current policies could 
lead to costly environmental degradation, irreversibly harming public land 
resources, and facilitating broader environmental problems such as global 
warming. Federal oil and gas lease sales increased by 86 percent from 2016 to 2017, 
evidencing a sharp policy reversal in how the nation manages these resources.125 
 
123.  See Blumm & Jamin, supra note 21, at 364.  
124.  Id.  
125.  See Darryl Fears, Trump Administration Tears Down Regulations to Speed Drilling on Public 
Land, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2018/02/01/trump-administration-tears-down-regulations-to-speed-drilling-on-
public-land/?utm_term=.a95365e5179c. There has been speculation about whether these oil and gas 
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Public lands include some of the most beautiful places in the U.S. Given that these 
lands hold many resources that are crucial to the long-term prosperity and quality 
of life for millions of current and future Americans, greater stability is needed in the 
policy structures designed to protect and manage them.   
III. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
As the Trump administration’s recent actions have aptly demonstrated, strong 
safeguards are needed to prevent any single presidential administration from 
unilaterally dismantling public lands protections to the detriment of future 
generations. This Part II makes a case for adding such increased safeguards to better 
protect the long-term conservation of the nation’s public land resources. Although 
the federal executive branch traditionally has broad powers in most regulatory 
contexts, the federal government’s fiduciary duty to protect public lands arguably 
justifies the imposition of heightened restrictions on the executive’s ability to 
weaken or abandon existing policies designed to protect those lands.  
Under trust law, a fiduciary is an entity that holds title to property and has a 
duty to manage the property for the benefit of the trustees or beneficiaries.126 In 
the context of public lands management, the Interior is effectively a fiduciary 
holding title to all public lands for the benefit of the trustees, which are present and 
future generations of Americans.127  This conception of the federal government’s 
role in public lands management is consistent with the public trust doctrine, which 
has been generally applied in similar contexts at the state government level. Legal 
rules that constrain the executive branch’s power to enact policies inconsistent 
with this fiduciary duty, are a reasonable and legitimate means of preventing 
presidential administrations from taking shortsighted actions inconsistent with this 
important fiduciary role.  
Broad delegations of regulatory power to the Interior have allowed the Trump 
administration to enact policies that arguably deviate too far from the primary 
purposes of those laws. The Trump administration’s “open for business” approach 
to federal public resource management focuses heavily on promoting short-term 
economic gain, without due regard for long-term environmental, health and 
economic consequences. As the following materials suggest, the public trust 
doctrine and related conceptions of governments’ roles in relation to public natural 
resources suggest that public land management is inherently different than other 
types of executive duties and warrants special treatment under the law. Principles 
 
stand in the way of development. Mark K. DeSantis, Oil and Gas Companies Gain by Stockpiling America’s 
Federal Land, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2018, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2018/08/29/455226/oil-gas-companies-
gain-stockpiling-americas-federal-land/ (arguing that President Trump’s policies have created perverse 
incentives; they have incentivized oil and gas companies to acquire as many leases as possible, and 
merely hold them as an asset so they can list the lease on their balance sheet, which immediately 
improves their financial health). 
126.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
127.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 23 (stating the Department of Interior is a steward for the public 
lands under the Federal Land Policy Management Act). See also Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the 
Sovereign Trust of the Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations, 
39 ENVTL. L. 91 (2009) (analyzing the fiduciary duty encoded in environmental statutes such as NEPA, 
ESA, and others). 
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from the academic literature, including those related to addressing externality 
problems, intergenerational inequities, and political rent-seeking problems, 
similarly support the placement of unique constraints on presidential power to 
safeguard federal public lands. 
A. Public Lands Deserve Special Protection 
 As the public trust doctrine suggests, government’s relationship to public 
lands is unique and thus arguably warrants distinctive treatment under the law. 
Placing specialized importance on public trust resources, the doctrine recognizes 
governments’ fiduciary duty to manage public lands for the benefit of all Americans.  
As the following subsections argue, this duty is materially different from those 
owed in relation to most other government-regulated industries and justifies the 
use of special constraints to ensure its long-term stability.   
i. The Specialized Importance of Public Trust Resources 
As the common law’s public trust doctrine has long suggested, governments 
have a special duty to preserve and protect public lands and other public natural 
resources.128  The public trust doctrine is a state common law doctrine with roots 
in English common law.129 Historically in the U.S., this included land held by the 
state governments, which was of value to the broader public.130 Although the 
common law’s public trust doctrine does not apply directly to federal lands, the 
principles supporting it emphasize the unique importance of public lands generally 
and of the government’s duty to preserve and protect them. The public trust 
doctrine’s core ideas are highlighted in the U.S. Supreme Court case Illinois Central 
Railroad v. Illinois.131 The Illinois Central court famously held that a state cannot 
grant title to submerged lands under navigable water to a private entity because 
the title held by the state “is a title held in trust for the people of the state, that 
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and 
have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private 
parties.”132  
In his 1970 article, Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, Professor Joseph L. Sax argued for an expansion of the public 
trust doctrine from one focused on the inalienability of certain public natural 
resources to a doctrine that could be used to promote the long-term preservation 
 
128.  See Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 
393, 405 (2009). 
129.  Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F.Supp.2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding Public Trust Doctrine is a 
creature of state common law); see also James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine is 
Bad for the Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 348 (2015). Legal scholars such as Richard Epstein and Charles 
Wilkinson have argued that the Public Trust Doctrine has roots in the constitution, id. at 354–56, but the 
Court in Alec L. v. Jackson rejected any constitutional foundation of the Public Trust Doctrine, Alec L., 
863 F.Supp.2d at 15–16.  
130.  Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).  
131.  Id.  
132.  Id. at 452. 
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of those resources.133 He characterized the doctrine as a “principle [which] holds 
that certain interests are so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that they ought 
to be reserved for the whole of the populace.”134 Under Sax’s characterization of 
the doctrine, governments held the duties of a trustee in their long-term 
preservation of public lands for the benefit of present and future generations.135 
Concededly, in the years following Sax’s re-imagination of the public trust 
doctrine, attempts at expansion of the doctrine have been limited. The doctrine has 
rarely been applied to resources beyond navigable waters and has not been applied 
to expressly impose such duties on the federal government.136 The Supreme Court 
recently held that the public trust doctrine is a state common law doctrine and that 
federal statutes displaced any federal common law claims based upon it.137   
However, it remains true that the nation and its present and future citizens 
and governments have a vested long-term interest in the public lands and that 
governments arguably thus hold a duty with regard to those resources. Public lands 
are irreplaceable, and allowing excessive exploitation of them could cause 
irreversible environmental damage. Even though the public trust doctrine does not 
presently impose an express duty on the Interior to protect federal public lands, it 
does generally highlight governments’ responsibility to manage such lands for the 
long-term benefit of society. The public trust doctrine could provide a normative 
standard to limit agency discretion and fill gaps in the regulatory regime 
implemented by the Interior under its authority pursuant to existing public land 
management statutes.138 It might also provide principles supporting revisions to 
existing federal lands management statutes that place clearer and stronger duties 
on the Interior with respect to the preservation of such lands.139  
ii. Interior’s Statutory Duty to Protect Public Lands Differentiates Public Land 
Development from Other Types of Federal Regulation 
 
133.  See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1970).  
134.  Id. at 484. Sax advocated for more judicial intervention to protect public trust resources 
when administrative agencies were failing to protect the environment, human health, and safety. Id. 
Currently, BLM and the Interior are disregarding the impact of expediting fossil fuel leases on public 
lands. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Letter on Cancellation of NAS 
Mountaintop Removal Mining Study (June 7, 2018). Therefore, Sax would argue that courts should 
intervene utilizing the public trust doctrine to limit the executive department’s recent actions.  
135.  Sax, supra note 1333, at 484. 
136.  The doctrine has been expanded to include: water related recreational uses, aesthetic value 
of rivers, and preservation of flora and fauna on public trust land, D.C. v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 
1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and a municipally owned beach to protect recreational uses, Van Ness v. Borough 
of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978).  One notable expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine occurred in 
the case National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, where the Supreme Court of California held that 
the public trust doctrine should be considered in reconsidering the allocation of water rights. Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983). 
137. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F.Supp.2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012). In this case, the plaintiffs argued the 
climate was a public trust resource, and the EPA breached their fiduciary duty to protect the climate by 
not acting aggressively enough to prevent climate change. Id. at 12. The court found that because the 
Clean Air Act empowered the EPA to set limits on air pollutants such as greenhouse gases, the court 
could not act for the agency and there was no public trust doctrine claim. Id. at 17. 
138.  See Babcock, supra note 1288, at 405.  
139.  See discussion infra Part III.  
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Several existing federal public land management statutes already declare, or 
at least imply, that the Interior holds a duty to protect public lands for current and 
future generations. The FLPMA, MLA, and Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act all 
articulate specific federal government duties related to the preservation of public 
lands.140 NEPA further clarifies the Interior’s duty by declaring that it is the 
“continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and 
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can 
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other 
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”141 
The FLPMA arguably specifically obliges the Interior to act as a fiduciary 
holding title to public lands for the benefit of all Americans. The FLPMA mandates 
that the Secretary of the Interior “manage the public lands under the principles of 
multiple use and sustained yield . . . .”142 Under the statute, this requires that the 
resources be managed to meet “the present and future needs of the American 
people” and requires the Interior to consider “the long-term needs 
of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources, including, but 
not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and 
natural scenic, scientific and historical value[] . . . .”143 This language imposes a clear 
duty on the Interior to ensure public lands are managed so that future generations 
will be able to continue enjoying the resources and benefits associated with them. 
Unlike a commercial private property owner focused on optimizing relatively short-
term financial gains, the Interior must consider the multiple potential uses for a 
resource and overall impacts on future generations when managing the public 
lands.144  
Some other primary statutes that govern public lands management do not as 
clearly articulate the Interior’s duties but still suggest that the Interior should act as 
a steward over federal public lands. The MLA grants the Secretary of the Interior 
the authority to include in mineral leases, provisions necessary to safeguard the 
public welfare.145 Still, even this language suggests that the Interior has a 
heightened duty compared to that of ordinary private landowners in that it must 
consider potential impacts on all citizens. 
In many industries, changes in presidential administrations lead to policy 
changes within federal agencies. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
courts generally uphold such regulatory changes so long as they are not arbitrary 
and capricious.146 When a federal agency rescinds a policy, its decision must be 
supported by reasoned decision-making.147 However, when agencies change 
 
140.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 35–36. Additionally, the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act 
(“OCSLA”) encodes a duty on the Interior to manage offshore federal resources; however, this paper is 
examining only the onshore public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018). 
141.  42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2018). 
142.  43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2018). 
143.  43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018). 
144.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 24. 
145.  30 U.S.C. § 187 (2018). 
146.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983). 
147.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51–52. 
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regulations they do not need to provide evidence that the new regulation is better 
than the old one.148 To meet the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard agencies 
must merely acknowledge they are changing the regulation and consider reliance 
interests that would be impacted by the change.149 And the Supreme Court has 
suggested in dicta that, in some regulatory areas such as automobile safety, policy 
changes based on changes in an administration are not troublesome.150   
However, the federal government owes no significant long-term duty to 
future generations in the context of automobile regulation and does owe such a 
duty in its management of public lands.151 Public lands policy changes can alter the 
quantity and quality of fossil fuels on public lands, the scenic value of public lands, 
or numerous other resources that necessarily impact future generations.152 
Accordingly, it is uniquely important that changes in public lands management 
remain at least somewhat stable from administration to administration. As will be 
discussed in section III.A.2., infra, this justifies the implementation of a unique set 
of constraints on the federal executive’s discretion in the management of public 
lands.  
B. Externality Problems Complicate Federal Land Management 
The externality problems inherent in public lands management are one reason 
that clear and stable rules are important in this regulatory area. Negative 
externalities can be simply defined as “costs an actor imposes on third parties.”153 
In situations under which an actor does not bear the full costs of her actions, it is 
unlikely the actor will sufficiently weigh costs external to her in the decision-making 
process, leading to excessive participation in the activity at issue.154 In the context 
of public lands management, individual presidential administrations arguably have 
inadequate incentives to weigh the full social costs associated with fossil fuel 
extraction activities on public lands. The following subsections highlight externality 
problems within federal public lands management and suggest potential means of 
making individual presidential administrations more fully internalize the long-run 
social costs of their decisions affecting federal lands.  
i. Externalities in Public Land Management  
 
148.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
149.  Id.  
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concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
151.  One might argue that the government has the duty to protect the safety of current 
Americans using motor vehicles, or a duty to protect children from hearing expletives. Even if we assume 
that those duties exist, the federal government does not hold title over all automobiles or have 
ownership interest in televisions or TV networks. 
152.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 3. 
153.  Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 137 
(2014).  
154.  See id.  
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Under the existing federal public lands management regime, a single 
presidential administration is not incentivized or required to consider the full costs 
of its agencies’ decisions.  For example, the Trump administration has supported its 
decision to open up more public lands for fossil fuel extraction by claiming that this 
approach is “all upside.”155 And proponents of streamlining the federal lands leasing 
process have often cited the need to reduce the federal budget deficit as 
justification for their proposed actions.156 Valuable resources are stored in public 
lands, and the extraction of those resources can often produce short-term 
economic growth. Members of Trump’s administration have suggested that 
opening up more public lands for business has no adverse repercussions and only 
results in “more jobs, more revenue[], more wealth, higher wages, and lower 
energy prices.”157  
However, a deeper look into the effects of leasing public lands for resource 
extraction reveals that current federal policymakers are effectively ignoring the 
many significant costs of such activities. Fossil fuel extraction on public lands can 
pollute the nation’s air and water, create increased greenhouse gas emissions, and 
deplete finite assets.158 The federal government has leased both onshore and 
offshore public lands to private companies for fossil fuel extraction, often with very 
little consideration of these significant costs.159 Under existing federal leasing 
structures, public land lessees can often externalize many of the environmental 
costs of their activities onto American citizens.160 These negative externality 
problems tend to lead to over-exploitation of public natural resources over the 
short run.161 
ii. Internalizing Externalities in Public Lands Management  
To promote more optimal levels of resource extraction on public lands, the 
Interior would need to amend its review process to better ensure that the full social 
costs of such activities to present and future citizens do not outweigh their short-
term benefits. Ideally, the agency could compel lessees to internalize more of the 
negative externalities associated with fossil fuel extraction on public lands through 
higher minimum bids and royalty rates that accounted for consequent 
environmental and health costs. In microeconomics terms, such higher royalty rates 
would act as a sort of Pigouvian tax, helping lessees to internalize more of the costs 
of activities occurring on leased federal lands.162 The Interior could then invest 
much of the additional revenue generated from these higher rates into programs 
aimed at addressing some of the environmental costs of such activities.   
 
155.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 3. 
156.  See Blumm & Jamin, supra note 21, at 367. 
157.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 3.  
158.  See id. at 2.  
159.  Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel Extraction on Federal Lands, 42 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 296 (2017).  
160.  Id. at 301.  
161.  See Hein, supra note 83, at 3.  
162.  See id. at 18.  
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The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”), conducts a cost-benefit 
analysis when deciding whether to lease lands on the Outer Continental Shelf with 
some features that modestly take this approach.163 The Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act requires the BOEM to analyze not only the economic impacts of leasing 
offshore lands, but also the environmental and social costs.164 Essentially, the 
BOEM compares the economic benefits of the proposed action and mitigates those 
benefits with the foreseeable costs. After taking into consideration all the costs 
associated with leasing offshore lands, the BOEM then compares those results to a 
“no leasing” course of action.165  
While the BOEM’s cost-benefit analysis framework is helpful when dealing 
with the problem of externalities, there are also drawbacks to this type of analysis. 
One obvious shortcoming of it is the difficulty of accurately assigning monetary 
value to social and environmental costs. For example, it is difficult to confidently 
valuate the loss of a species. The inability of government officials to agree on what 
constitutes the best available science also contributes to this problem.166 Still, 
expressly requiring the Interior to account for environmental costs when 
negotiating federal extraction lease rates could potentially help to address 
externality problems in the leasing of public lands. Regardless, these inherent 
externality problems make public lands management warrant the use of strong 
safeguards to limit inefficient behavior in this regulatory area. 
 
C. Myopic Policymaking and Intergenerational Equity  
The myopic tendencies of American voters and the government officials who 
serve them with regard to public lands provide further justification for special 
safeguards to promote greater long-term policy stability. Myopic behavior can be 
defined as “seeking short-term profit regardless of long-term consequences.”167 
Myopic tendencies can create challenges within the business world, causing 
managers to focus too intently on pleasing current shareholders and not enough on 
how current actions might affect the long-term health of a business.168 For instance, 
a current manager might take actions that are focused too heavily on bringing 
current earnings reports in line with quarterly projections, and not enough on 
furthering long-run goals.169  Such problems arise partly because of existing 
 
163.  Id. at 28.   
164.  Id.  
165.  Id.  
166.  Travis O. Brandon, Fearful Asymmetry: How the Absence of Public Participation in Section 7 
of the ESA Can Make the “Best Available Science” Unavailable for Judicial Review, 39 HARV. ENVTL. REV. 
311, 315 (2015).  
167.  Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 
265, 267 (2012).  
168.  See Natalie Mizik & Robert Jacobson, The Cost of Myopic Management, HARV. BUS. REV., July–
Aug. 2017, https://hbr.org/2007/08/the-cost-of-myopic-management.  
169.  For example, myopic tendencies created by existing incentive structures or bounded 
rationality can cause managers to fire employees or excessively reduce budgets for research and 
innovation in an effort to reduce short-term costs, even if such actions are likely to have significant 
negative long-term consequences. See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long Term Shareholders and 
Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 560 (2016).  
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incentives structures surrounding managers or because a manager does not expect 
to still be with her company when the long-run negative consequences of short-
sighted actions become apparent.170   
The current administration’s decision to significantly increase private 
industrial development on public lands is a similar example of myopic decision-
making. Politicians, like managers of a business, tend to be more focused on the 
interests of current voters and stakeholders than on future stakeholders who have 
yet to be born. The U.S. economy may likely get a short-term boost from a 
significant increase in the extraction activities on public lands, but the 
administration is arguably not adequately weighing the long-term consequences of 
this adjusted approach to federal lands management. Such myopic behavior is 
unsurprising because, like business managers, today’s political leaders will likely be 
out of office by the time the full consequences of their short-sighted resource 
management actions are realized. These tendencies are yet another reason why 
policymakers need to better insulate federal lands management laws from the 
short-term whims of present-day politicians.  
As other scholars have suggested, the term “intergenerational equity” 
arguably incorporates both the legal standard that all generations are equal and the 
moral principle that no generation should be held above another.171 When the 
federal government issues a lease for fossil fuel extraction on federal lands, the 
lessee secures lease rights and the government secures a stream of lease payment 
revenues, but millions of other present and future Americans are also affected.172 
As Trump administration actions highlighted above suggest, agencies do not always 
have sufficient incentives to fully weigh costs to future generations in lease 
negotiations and arguably have too much discretion to undervalue those costs. 
Accordingly, promoting intergenerational equity in the federal leasing context 
requires that there be deep-rooted standards in place to ensure that present 
decision-makers adequately consider the rights and needs of future generations.173  
Legal rules in some other countries are much more effective at ensuring that 
current policymakers adequately weigh their decisions’ impacts on future 
generations. For example, in 1993 a young group of Filipino minors successfully 
sued the Filipino government on its own behalf and the behalf of future 
generations.174 The Supreme Court of the Philippines ultimately upheld the current 
citizens’ claim on behalf of future generations, finding that “every generation has a 
responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony [of nature] for the 
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.”175 Of course, such concepts 
are not presently recognized under U.S. federal law.  
 
170.  See Mizik, supra note 1688. 
171.  James C. Wood, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 
295 (1996).  
172.  See infra Section I.D.3.  
173.  Wood, supra note 1711, at 299.  
174.  Id. at 324–25.   
175.  Oposa v. Factoran, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, 802–03 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.). See Wood, supra note 
172, at 324. 
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Some state law regimes are also better-equipped than the federal lands 
management regulatory structure for deterring myopic decision making and 
promoting intergenerational equity. For instance, certain provisions in 
Pennsylvania’s constitution expressly recognize the importance of protecting the 
state’s natural resources for generations to come. Article 1, § 27 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution reads:  
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the 
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common 
property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee 
of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain 
them for the benefit of all the people.176  
This state constitutional provision arguably requires Pennsylvania’s current 
generation of leaders to act as trustees and require currently living Pennsylvanians 
to bear costs reasonably necessary to ensure that future generations’ interests in 
the state’s natural resources are adequately protected. Although no such provisions 
are present in the U.S. Constitution, Congress could incorporate language into 
public lands management statutes that expressly embraces the same principles.  
Such language might constrain federal agencies’ discretion to allow excessive 
exploitation of federal public resources for short term economic or political gain. 
D. Public Choice Theory and Public Lands Management 
Public choice theory provides additional insights into the recent shift in 
federal public lands management policies and how Congress and other 
policymakers might address those shifts. Public choice theory is a positive economic 
theory that seeks to explain the behavior of government actors and individuals in 
the political sphere.177 It challenges the assumption that government actors are 
acting for the public good and instead operates under the assumption that political 
outcomes are a result of self-interested individual behavior.178 While it does not 
offer normative prescriptions, public choice theory is useful because an accurate 
description of a problem that is impairing policymaking can provide insights on how 
to address it.179  
This subsection draws from public choice theory concepts to highlight possible 
reasons why the nation’s federal lands management statutes such as the FLPMA 
and MLA delegate such broad legislation to agencies and to offer some ideas for 
 
176.  PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.  
177.  See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” Failed, 
18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 416–17 (1994). 
178.  See William Dubinsky, Book Review, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1992) (reviewing DANIEL A. 
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991)). See also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & 
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 11 (Yale Univ. Press, 1997) (stating that public 
choice theory seeks to “understand political outcomes as a function of self-interested individual 
behaviors”). 
179.  See Blumm, supra note 1777, at 416 (stating that public choice theory does not offer 
normative aspirations); See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 1788, at 1 (stating that public choice theory is 
useful because “our vision of what is guides our approach to what ought to be”). 
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how these broad delegations might be corrected. These materials also highlight 
how rent-seeking behavior involving the fossil fuel industry may be undermining 
certain goals of federal lands management statutes and identifies some possible 
means of limiting such behavior and its consequences.  
i. Explaining (and Ultimately Correcting) Excessively Broad Legislative 
Delegations 
 Congress’s delegation of very broad discretion to the Interior in its 
management of public lands under the FLPMA and MLA is more fully understood 
when viewed through the lens of public choice theory. Such broad delegations may 
have been an effective way for Congress to balance competing political pressures it 
faced when it enacted the bills: pressures to respond to a growing environmental 
movement and to simultaneously promote greater energy independence.  
Under a public choice theory framework, reelection is a driving motivation for 
self-interested legislators and winning reelection requires the broad support of 
relevant constituents.180 Within this familiar framework, rationally self-interested 
legislators seek to satisfy important stakeholders and avoid angering other 
constituents in efforts to increase their likelihood of reelection. As highlighted 
within the public choice literature, legislators typically appease their constituents 
through two types of actions: writing or voting in favor of certain legislation, or 
putting visible pressure on federal agencies in the executive branch to act in ways 
that favor their constituents.181 When legislators enact a bill that appeases a 
particular stakeholder group but gives broad discretion to an agency to ultimately 
implement the new law, such legislators can potentially have the best of both 
worlds. By enacting this type of broad-delegation bill, a legislator can get kudos 
from the stakeholders who championed it yet empower a federal agency to actually 
implement the bill in ways that avoid angering the constituents who’d opposed it.182  
In the context of public lands, both the FLPMA and MLA purport to be 
environmental conservation statutes yet contain very broad delegations to the 
Interior that empower the agency to serve the interests of the resource extraction 
industry. The FLPMA delegates to the Secretary of the Interior the authority to 
manage public lands under the principles of “multiple use and sustained yield.”183 
However, the definitions of “multiple use” and “sustained yield” seem to promote 
opposite values. “Multiple use” emphasizes the importance of taking a holistic 
approach. It requires the Secretary to consider the: 
long-term needs of future generations for renewable and 
nonrenewable resources including but not limited to recreation, range, 
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, 
scientific and historical values . . . and not necessarily to the 
 
180.  See Dubinsky, supra note 1788, at 1513. 
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182. See Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary 
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combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or 
the greatest unit output.184  
In contrast, “‘sustained yield’ means the achievement and maintenance in 
perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various 
renewable resources.”185 Read in combination, it is unclear whether the Secretary 
should prioritize preservation, extraction or another mentioned use. The Secretary 
is left with the power to decide which use to prioritize.186  
This confusing statutory language is more easily explained within the 
framework of public choice theory: legislators who enacted it may have sought to 
appease constituents concerned about environmental issues while also appeasing 
the fossil fuel industry. FLPMA became a law in 1976, during a time when the 
environmental movement was strong yet there was intense  concern about the 
United States’ energy security.187 In a nod to both interests, Congress enacted a 
statute purporting to promote the preservation of public lands for future 
generations that actually led to increased fossil fuel extraction on those lands.   
The MLA similarly grants broad discretion to the Interior regarding fossil fuel 
leasing on public lands.188  It states that lands “which are known or believed to 
contain oil or gas deposits may be leased by the Secretary.”189  This has been 
interpreted to mean that the Secretary has broad authority to determine if lands 
will even be put up for auction, effectively deputizing the agency to make the hard 
decisions.190 This broad grant of authority to the Interior Secretary has led to 
significant uncertainty and instability in federal mineral leasing. Since the 
enactment of the statute, the federal government has placed moratoria on such 
leases on multiple occasions. Most recently, President Obama’s administration 
placed a moratorium on coal leases under the MLA.191 President Trump then ended 
the moratorium shortly after taking office and replaced it with a policy of expediting 
fossil fuel leases.192 The broad delegations to the Interior set forth in the FLPMA and 
MLA may have benefited the legislators who enacted those provisions, but such 
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185.  Id. at § 1702(h).  
186.  Legislative History indicates that it was Congress’ intention to leave choices to the “whims 
of the Secretary” in order to allow for flexible management of the resources. Management of National 
Resource Lands: Hearing on S.507 Before the S. Subcomm. on Env’t. and Land Res., 94th Cong. 92 (1975) 
[hereinafter Hearing on S.507]. 
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delegations now only facilitate uncertainty and dramatic policy swings with each 
change in presidential leadership.  
ii. Statutorily Limiting Federal Agencies’ Discretion to Promote Stability in Land 
Management 
Placing greater statutory constraints on the Interior and BLM would help to 
reduce the wide political pendulum swings that presently afflict federal public lands 
management in the United States. By promoting greater stability, narrower 
statutory delegations would help to ensure that federal agencies manage federal 
lands more consistently across presidential administrations and would ultimately 
better protect these public resources.193  
Ideally, statutory delegations of authority to federal agencies involved in 
public lands management would more clearly articulate an overarching goal 
centered on long-term preservation and protection.194 There is some evidence that 
such approaches have proven successful at the state government level.  For 
instance, one study examining management plans for state owned lands in 
Michigan found that replacing multiple-use mandates with a dominant-use 
mandate significantly reduced the exploitation of public resources.195 Among other 
things, the study noted that the management plan for an area called the Pigeon 
River Forest contained a multiple-use mandate, and the land was subsequently 
opened for oil drilling.196 In contrast, the Sand Lakes Quiet Area’s management plan 
stated that the dominant use of the site was non-motorized recreational uses, and 
drilling never resulted there because it was deemed incompatible with the primary 
purpose articulated in the statute.197 In the case of FLPMA, its broad multiple-use 
mandate was originally intended to allow for flexible management of resources and 
not to promote the drilling of fossil fuels on public lands, but the mandate itself did 
not clearly evidence those intentions. Narrowing the mandate would make 
Congress’s intent clearer and would help ensure the land is used as Congress 
intended and not overexploited.  
More specific and clearly defined statutory mandates would also make federal 
land management policy more stable and thereby promote more efficient levels of 
private investment.198  For example, there is some evidence that uncertainty about 
administrative priorities in forest management policy has prevented some 
stakeholders from investing in the development of forest resources.199 Limiting 
 
193.  Cf. Rossi, supra note 1822, at 1751.  Many public choice theorists are anti-delegation and 
antiregulation and believe when Congress delegates authority to agencies they are abdicating their 
legislative duties. Id. They argue this abdication is bad because it disempowers the electorate. Id. See 
also David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 606–07 (1997). 
194.  See Karen L. Ferguson, This Land is Our Land: Private Interests in Public Lands, 2 MICH. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 187, 247–48 (1997). 
195.  Id. at 248. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id.  
198. See Martin Nie, Statutory Detail and Administrative Discretion in Public Lands Governance: 
Arguments and Alternatives, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 268 (2004). 
199.  Id. at 269. 
 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 56 
 
532 
federal agencies’ discretion over public lands management decisions could give 
markets greater long-term certainty about how the government would conduct 
such management, ultimately leading to greater levels of private investment.  
iii. Recognizing and Addressing the Fossil Fuel Industry’s Rent-Seeking Behavior 
Public choice theory’s literature relating to rent-seeking behavior offers 
additional insights into the challenges facing federal lands management and how 
to address them.  As interest group theory would predict, the fossil fuel industry’s 
substantial and direct interest in public land management policies incentivizes them 
to engage in rent-seeking behavior and ultimately results in suboptimal policy 
decisions. Special interest groups receive concentrated benefits when governments 
enact or adopt policies that favor them, and this prospect of concentrated benefits 
often incentivizes such groups to engage aggressively in rent-seeking behavior.200  
Rent-seeking behavior occurs when an industry acts through lobbying or other 
efforts to induce government intervention in the market for the industry’s own 
benefit.201 Rent-seeking may benefit certain specific industry stakeholders, but it 
usually results in a net loss to the public at large.202 In contrast to the concentrated 
benefits at stake for a special interest group, the costs to the general public are 
often diffused and more attenuated. Accordingly, individual citizens have weaker 
incentives to engage in rent-seeking behavior and are less able to act collectively to 
do so because of various collective action problems.203  
In the context of public lands, fossil fuel companies are a powerful special 
interest group that stands to receive large and heavily concentrated economic gains 
from favorable policy decisions. In fiscal year 2016, oil and gas development on 
lands managed by BLM contributed $42 billion to the American economy.204 The 
sheer size and financial wealth of the oil and gas industry makes it comparatively 
easy and appealing for these companies to engage in rent-seeking behavior. 
 Rent-seeking behavior in public lands management today is most visible at 
the federal government level, where fossil fuel industry stakeholders seek to 
influence government action by lobbying the President and Congress. The oil and 
coal industries contributed heavily to President Donald Trump’s campaign in hopes 
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that he would enact policies that would promote the industry.205 Upon taking office, 
President Trump rewarded these lobbying efforts by reversing multiple Obama-era 
land management policies and appointing many former oil and gas industry 
lobbyists to high positions within the Interior—actions that have undoubtedly 
benefited these industries.206  
In contrast, the adverse impacts of increased extraction activities on public 
lands under the Trump-era regulatory regime are diffused across all Americans and 
even future Americans. Opening more public lands to resource extraction often 
effectively prioritizes that use above numerous other statutorily-recognized uses 
that involve a diffused set of individuals.207 Moreover, a major downstream effect 
of increased fossil fuel development is the burning of fossil fuels, which creates air 
pollution and contributes to climate change in ways that impose modest costs on 
millions or perhaps billions of humans.208 Climate change’s impacts are not only 
diffused across all of America but are diffused across time because future 
generations will likely suffer its impacts more than the current generation.209 
Scientists predict that increased warming could cause sea level rise, species 
extinction, and risks related to food security, water supply, and human health.210  
The diffused costs spread among each individual American from the impacts 
of increased extraction activities on public lands are generally not sufficient to 
incentivize most individuals to act.  In contrast, the concentrated benefits at stake 
for fossil fuel companies incentivize them to aggressively seek to influence policy at 
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various levels of government. In fact, between 2000 and 2016 the fossil fuel 
industry spent 10 times more on climate change lobbying than environmental 
organizations.211 One potential consequence of this mismatch is the 
overexploitation of public lands. 
Innovative changes to the federal statutory scheme governing public lands 
could better limit the fossil fuel industry’s influence on regulators in public lands 
policy. In Federalist 10, James Madison acknowledged that the “[c]auses of faction 
cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling 
its effects.”212  In other words, there will always be special interest groups, so 
policymakers must design regulatory structures to minimize rent-seeking behavior 
and its effects. For instance, in the context of public land leasing the competitive 
market has not functioned properly.213 This is because incumbent resource users 
have learned how to suppress competitive pressures and tailor the process to their 
needs.214 Comprehensive reforms that better prevent such manipulation over the 
long run will be needed to address these challenges and promote a more efficient 
and sustainable approach to public lands management. 
 
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 The unique importance of the federal government’s duty to preserve and 
protect public lands warrants the creation of a more stable and insulated policy 
structure that more effectively limits executive discretion in this regulatory area. 
Because public lands are owned in common by all Americans yet are susceptible to 
excessive exploitation by individual companies and politicians for short-term gain, 
federal agencies should not have the same discretion in managing these lands as 
they have in governing many other industries. The current federal statutory 
framework delegates excessively broad authority to the Interior to manage the 
nation’s public lands, which has resulted in unstable and inefficient policies. These 
broad delegations encompass such a wide range of policy approaches that the 
approaches of public land management officials often swing widely from 
presidential administration to administration. Such broad delegations also make 
these federal agencies susceptible to rent-seeking behavior in the public lands 
management context. This Part III describes how a new comprehensive, 
overarching statute could designed to better address these risks.   
A. Potential Solution:  A Comprehensive Overarching Public Lands Statute 
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A new comprehensive, overarching federal statute governing the 
management of public lands could potentially help to address the various problems 
that presently afflict federal public land management. Ironically, the Federal Land 
Policy Management Act was originally enacted with a similar goal of making federal 
public land management more focused and concise.215 Prior to the enactment of 
FLPMA, there were 3,000 public land laws, many of which were contradictory.216 
The current statutory scheme is much more concise than that system, but even 
greater precision would alleviate some of the problems that are currently plaguing 
it.217  Specifically, federal public land policy would be more stable and less 
susceptible to special interests if Congress were to enact statutory changes that: (1) 
create a dominant policy goal of “preserving the ecological integrity of public lands” 
to accompany the existing goals of “multiple use and sustained yield 
management,”218 (2) mandate a higher standard of review for agency changes to 
public lands policies, and (3) ensure that federal lands lease payments were high 
enough to ensure that lessees internalized the broader environmental and other 
social costs of their activities.   
 
 
i. Modifying the “Multiple Use and Sustained Yield” Mandate 
One way of improving federal lands management would be to add a new, 
expressly dominant policy goal of “preserving the ecological integrity of public 
lands” to the FLPMA’s existing “multiple use and sustained yield” mandate.  The 
“multiple use and sustained yield” mandate alone has proven to be an ineffective 
mandate for managing public lands because it is susceptible to a wide range of 
interpretations and thus allows for equally wide policy changes each time a new 
president takes office. The existing mandate does have merit and deserves to 
remain intact because it encourages agencies to take a holistic approach to 
management and allow for mining in some circumstances. However, adding to it a 
dominant policy goal such as that of “preserving ecological integrity” could help to 
cabin the Interior’s discretion and thereby make public land management more 
stable and effective at its primary goals.219   
Ecological integrity has been defined elsewhere in the U.S. Code to mean “a 
landscape where ecological processes are functioning to maintain the structure, 
composition, activity, and resilience of the landscape over time.”220 Such an 
ecological integrity mandate is already guiding the management of the national 
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parks, military parks, monuments, and seashores.221 If this mandate were extended 
to all public lands, it would narrow agencies’ primary focus onto the long-term 
maintenance of federal public land resources and  facilitate a more consistent policy 
for all public lands. Such an additional mandate would likewise align the overall 
statutory mandate more closely with the federal government’s duty to manage 
public lands for the benefit of all present and future generations of Americans. 
An even clearer definition of “ecological integrity” in connection with such a 
new mandate might even further strengthen its positive effects on federal public 
land management policy. For instance, Canada’s National Parks Act defines 
“ecological integrity” as “. . . a condition that is determined to be characteristic of 
its natural region and likely to persist, including abiotic components and the 
composition and abundance of native species and biological communities, rates of 
change and supporting processes.”222 It might be beneficial to incorporate 
components of the Canadian definition into the new U.S. definition because it 
includes additional details, such as the distinction between biotic and abiotic 
resources, and acknowledges natural rates of change.223 Including these additional 
details in the definition would make the delegation of authority to agencies under 
this new statute narrower than under FLPMA.  
Some may argue that such a narrow delegation would not give the Interior 
sufficient flexibility in its management of public lands.  Certainly, the Interior needs 
flexibility to effectively address specific circumstances in the wide range of localities 
it manages across the U.S. Moreover, some public choice theorists argue that broad 
delegations better serve the public good by allowing for interest group 
competition.224 And allowing agencies to exercise more discretion might arguably 
make decision-making more democratic in some contexts if it allows for more direct 
communication with the public during the rulemaking process.225 Still, others might 
argue that although executive agencies are apolitical, they are also directly 
accountable to a president who has the power to remove agency department heads 
at will and direct policy. Based on this, such theorists have argued that statutory 
schemes that grant broad delegations to the executive branch may actually 
enhance the general welfare.226  
However true such counterarguments may be in other situations, they are 
highly questionable in the unique context of federal public lands management.  In 
the context of public lands, Congress’ broad “multiple-use sustained yield” 
mandate has already clearly produced suboptimal policy outcomes. A “multiple-use 
and sustained yield” approach that gives wider discretion to agencies has not 
worked in part because of the rent-seeking problems highlighted above, which are 
far from democratic.227 Furthermore, a mandate “preserving ecological integrity” 
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would encourage land managers to consider the specific ecology of a location and 
thereby allow for flexibility while still limiting the executive branch’s authority to 
make major policy decisions—such as whether to expedite leasing or place 
moratoria on leases.   Accordingly, narrowing the scope of agency authority in this 
unique circumstance seems more likely to ensure that the public lands are managed 
for the benefit of both present and future generations of Americans. 
ii. Higher Standard of Review when Public Lands Policies are Changed or 
Revoked 
A new statutory regime for public lands management should also require a 
higher standard of review when agencies propose to revoke or change a public 
lands management policy. Under the APA, reviewing courts must set aside agency 
action that is arbitrary and capricious, and there is no higher standard for changing 
or rescinding rules.228 A higher standard of review mandated by federal statute 
could require agencies to explain why their new policy enables them to meet their 
statutory duty to protect the public lands better than does the existing policy.229 
This would require agencies to do more than supply a reasoned analysis, address 
reliance interests, and announce that they are changing the rule.230  It would require 
them to clearly articulate why this new change strengthens their fulfillment of their 
primary duty to promote ecological integrity. 
Such a higher standard of review could weaken special interest groups’ ability 
to influence policy making through rent-seeking behavior. Presumably, such a new 
standard would also make it more difficult for a newly-elected president to swiftly 
water down existing public lands policies for short-term political gain.   
iii. Review and Amend Fiscal Terms of Leases 
Any novel statutory regime to promote more efficient and stable federal lands 
management should also include specific provisions aimed at improving the 
nation’s outmoded leasing system.  The current leasing structure for public lands 
for fossil fuel extraction is both inadequate and outdated. Some of the fiscal terms 
under which federal agencies lease public lands for resource extraction have not 
been amended, nor reviewed since the 1920s.231 This has enabled many private 
companies to pay sub-optimally low rents and royalty rates for public resources, to 
the detriment of taxpayers and broader society. Congress needs to finally review 
and update these fiscal terms to enable them to adapt over time to changes in 
inflation, energy production technology, and modern science on climate change but 
only in ways that would further promote environmental conservation. Such 
updates to the terms of public lands leases could also be structured to compel 
lessees to internalize more of the broader social costs of their fossil fuel production. 
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One straightforward means of improving federal leasing laws would be to 
eliminate the broad existing loopholes that lessees currently use to discount their 
royalty rate payments. Under the current framework, the Secretary of the Interior 
has wide discretion to reduce or eliminate royalty payments “whenever in [his or 
her] judgment it is necessary to do so in order to promote development, or 
whenever in [his or her] judgment the leases cannot be successfully operated under 
the terms provided therein.”232 Through its rent-seeking behavior, the fossil fuel 
industry is often able to take advantage of these loopholes and pay artificially low 
royalty rates for public mineral resources. Limiting the Interior’s description to 
discount rates would help to mitigate this problem.233  
V. CONCLUSION 
The nation’s public natural resources hold tremendous value for current and 
future generations. Protecting these resources from the short-sighted whims of 
government officials and industry giants is crucial to their long-term security and 
should be a clear and dominant goal of modern public lands management laws. 
Unfortunately, the current federal lands management framework is ill-equipped to 
protect America’s precious public land resources from overexploitation. Existing 
public lands statutes grant broad authority to the executive branch, enabling fossil 
fuel industry interests to exert excessive influence over policy decisions in ways that 
jeopardize conservation of these resources and harm the general population. The 
federal government’s duty to conserve public lands for the benefit of present and 
future generations requires the creation of a more stable policy structure with 
provisions that place unique limits on executive authority. Specifically, a new 
comprehensive public land management statute is needed that introduces an 
overarching policy goal of “preserving ecological integrity,” imposes higher review 
standards for agency policy changes, and modernizes the federal land leasing 
process to better account for the externalities of fossil fuel extraction activities. 
Such changes would promote greater intergenerational equity, require the Interior 
to act more intently as a fiduciary in its management of public lands, and limit the 
discretion of the executive branch to prevent wide pendulum swings in public lands 
management policy. The long-term stability of America’s public lands requires a 
comprehensive set of actions that account for the full costs of leasing public lands 
and uses the best available science. Only through such changes will it be possible to 
ensure that the nation’s precious public land and mineral resources will be 
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